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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz envisaged human knowledge as a common, public project. In sharp contrast to the Cartesian view of a solitary thinker who is required, as a starting point, to “doubt all things” received from others and hold them to be false, Leibniz advocated collecting and combining the old lore of the ancients and the new doctrines of the moderns, the teachings of various nations and generations, and the works of different individuals. This was not merely an eclectic assembling of materials but also a work of organizing and bringing in consistency and coherence. He warned us to “guard against being more eager to destroy than to construct”, and claimed that “if we overlook entirely the harsher things which they say against others, the writings of outstanding men, both ancient and modern, usually contain many true and good things which deserve to be collected and arranged in the public treasury of knowledge” (SD 436).
Only rarely such transmissions of ideas and perspectives are smooth. As is only natural, some are at odds with others. Hence, not only organization is needed but also bringing in consistency and coherence. Open discussion and controversy were accordingly for Leibniz an essential vehicle for transforming an ever expanding aggregate of data and information into a coherent “public treasury of knowledge”. It is not for no good reason that in the recent work of Marcelo Dascal (2006), Leibniz is celebrated as a master in “the art of controversies”. Leibniz’s practice was usually in accord with this conception. He was involved in the institution of intellectual journals, societies and academies, and engaged in vast correspondence and public discussions. It was thus no empty gesture or rhetorical lip service in writing on the occasion of publishing his New System that he had “decided upon this [i.e., publishing it] chiefly in order to profit by the criticisms of those who are informed on such matters, since it would be too burdensome to seek out and call to my aid individually those who would be disposed to give me instruction” (NS § 1; L 453).
There is a certain episode, however, in which Leibniz’s practice seems to deviate from this prima facie compelling view of the evolution of human knowledge. This involves the vis viva controversy.​[1]​ The controversy was primarily concerned with two questions. First, how to define and measure the force of a body in motion; and second, which one of the two quantities held by the parties to the controversy to be the correct measure of that force is conserved in nature. It was often thought that the controversy was a mere dispute of words. If “force” is not directly accessible but has to be defined by its observable effects, and if, further, it can be argued and shown by experiments that it is possible to measure both rival Cartesian and Leibnizian quantities as effects of forces, then there is nothing substantial to the problem and it is only a terminological sophistry. 
This line of thought has been attributed most prominently to Jean d’Alembert, who is conceived by many as the resolver of the dispute. Equipped with an uncompromising positivistic approach, d’Alembert sought to exclude obscure or metaphysical concepts from mechanics, the notion of force included. If anything, the word “force” can be taken to refer to the observable effects of the putative entity which presumably caused them. Now both the Cartesian and the Leibnizian quantities are in fact measurable effects. Moreover, they can be reduced to Newtonian terms: the former is the product of the Newtonian force and the period of time of its application, the latter is the product of the Newtonian force and the distance through which it was effective. Hence, d’Alembert concluded, arguments with regard to measures of force are useless in mechanics.
D’Alembert’s denunciation of the controversy in his Treatise on Dynamics of 1743 has been held by historians of science to persuade his contemporaries of its futility and to effectively put an end to it. Ernst Mach (1960: 365) thought that the controversy “lasted fifty-seven years, till the appearance of D’Alembert’s Traité de Dynamique, in 1743”. Florian Cajori (1960: 58-59) noted that “the controversy lasted over half a century, until finally, it was brought to a close by Jean-le-Rond D’Alembert’s remarks in the preface to his Dynamique”. H.G. Alexander (1956: xxxi) wrote that “the dispute about moving force came effectively to an end after the publication in 1743 of D’Alembert’s Traité de Dynamique”. Writers who do not subscribe to the view that the controversy has been a mere dispute of words also consider d’Alembert the resolver of the problem.​[2]​ 
Recently, Martin Schönfeld has crowned d’Alembert as “the historical winner of the vis viva debate”. He argued that “D’Alembert’s solution rested on a deliberate choice: he wanted to investigate what could be investigated quantitatively and simply ignored the rest”, the rest being the talk of forces and especially of their metaphysical aspects. This choice enabled him to clearly conceive that both the Cartesian and the Leibnizian forces “denote real and distinct aspects of physical interaction” and thus to see that “Descartes and Leibniz were both right in their own way” (Schönfeld 2000: 31-34).
In what follows I would like to argue that this line of thought cannot solve Leibniz’s problem. As we shall presently see, Leibniz had already argued, half a century before d’Alembert proposed his solution, that when investigated quantitatively, indeed both forces turn out to be true and legitimate. It was precisely the metaphysical consideration, which d’Alembert undertook to bypass, that Leibniz had been seeking to bring to the fore, in order to determine which force should be given priority over the other. D’Alembert, however, could not have known this. In his public polemics against the Cartesians, Leibniz eagerly argued for his own measure, and seemed to do it at the expense of rejecting completely the quantity offered by Descartes. Due to this false impression Kant could still wrongly but justifiably write, sixty years after the initiation of the controversy and between the two editions of d’Alembert’s Treatise, that Leibniz “rejected Descartes’s law absolutely and without reservation and set immediately his own [law] in its place”.​[3]​ Indeed, Leibniz could have spared his contemporaries and successors much of the ado, had he openly emphasized the genuine nature of his problem, as he did in some of his unpublished papers.​[4]​  
2 Descartes’s principle of conservation of quantity of motion

The controversy erupted in 1686 with Leibniz’s publication of A Brief Demonstration of a Notable Error of Descartes and Others Concerning a Natural Law, According to Which God is Said Always to Conserve the Same Quantity of Motion; a Law Which They Also Misuse in Mechanics in the Acta Eruditorum, in which he attacked the Cartesian measure of force. Let us consider first Descartes’s position. Descartes’s philosophy of nature begins, as is well known, with the assertion that the essence of matter or body is extension. There is nothing inherently in material bodies save the passive geometrical property of extension. The nature of body thus does not consist in any physical or sensible qualities such as weight, hardness, or color, not to mention the four basic qualities or the forms of the scholastic tradition.​[5]​ Furthermore, since spatial extension is nothing but a property of the extended material substance (Principles of Philosophy 1.53), there can be no space where there is no body (Ibid. 2.10-12). Hence, space and body are one and the same thing, considered from different perspectives.​[6]​ 
Descartes goes on to draw from this statement some further conclusions: that there are no empty spaces or void in the world (Principles of Philosophy 2.16-17); that there can be no simple indivisible material particles or atoms (Ibid. 2.20, 4.202); and that the physical world consists of indefinitely extended uniform matter (Ibid. 2.21-22). The apparent variation and diversity in such a world is to be explained solely geometrically in terms of size, shape, and movement of parts of matter.​[7]​
Since matter in Cartesian physics is essentially passive and inert, it cannot be the source of its own motion. There must be some other cause, external to matter, from which motion originates. Descartes identifies the ultimate source of motion of matter with God. From the fact that God’s perfection is evident not only from his immutable nature, but also from his immutable and completely constant way of action, a rule of conservation of motion follows. According to this rule, God preserves at each instant of the world the same “quantity of motion”, as that which was imparted to matter in its creation. “That is why”, says Descartes, “we must think that when one part of matter moves twice as fast as another twice as large, there is as much motion in the smaller as in the larger; and that whenever the movement of one part decreases, that of another increases exactly in proportion”. That is, there are two factors relevant to the calculation of the quantity of motion: the “size” of the body and its speed. The quantity of motion which is conserved in the world is to be calculated by the product of the “size” of the body or its mass,​[8]​ and its speed (mv).​[9]​
However the motion of bodies may be naturally​[10]​ changed, the sum of their quantities of motion () will remain unaltered. In Descartes’s universe changes of motion occur only through contact. Thus, the paradigmatic case in which the Cartesian principle of conservation of quantity of motion is supposed to be most clearly evident is the occasion of impact between bodies. When two bodies collide, the sum of the quantities of motion of the two after the impact remains the same as the sum of their quantities of motion prior to their collision. Descartes supplements this general principle of conservation with three laws of nature which also result “from the immutability and simplicity of the operation by which God maintains movement in matter” (Principles of Philosophy 2.37-42), the third of which deals with bodies “coming in contact” and is specified by Descartes’s seven famous, and notably erroneous, rules of impact (Ibid. 2.46-52). 
Now, the force of a body in motion consists in the striving of the moving body to remain in the same state and to continue its motion, and is measured by the mass of the body and its speed. Hence the measure of force of a body in motion is the body’s quantity of motion. This quantity is never changed in the world. It is redistributed in impacts of bodies in accordance with their forces of motion and resistance, but its sum total always remains the same.​[11]​
3 Leibniz’s criticism of the Cartesian conservation principle

It is Descartes’s principle of conservation of force as quantity of motion that Leibniz takes issue with in Brief Demonstration of 1686 and in subsequent writings. The argument of Brief Demonstration is designed to present a case in which the amount of “motive force” of two moving bodies is equal and conserved through some process of change, while the “quantities of motion” they acquire in the process are not the same. From this Leibniz derives the conclusion that the motive force conserved in nature is something different from Descartes’s quantity of motion and is not to be estimated by the product of mass and speed. The “process of change” which Leibniz employs in his argument is not that of colliding bodies or impact, but rather that of free falling bodies.
The argument opens with two assumptions, both of which, Leibniz believes, are acceptable to the Cartesians. The first assumption asserts that while falling unimpeded from a certain height a body acquires exactly the amount of force which is necessary to raise it back to the same height. According to the second, the force necessary to raise a body A of 1 pound to a height of 4 yards is the same as that which is required in order to raise a body B of 4 pounds to a height of 1 yard. Now from these two assumptions it follows, that two bodies, A of 1 pound and B of 4 pounds falling freely from 4 yards and 1 yard respectively, will have the same amount of force at the bottom point of their falling. For according to the first assumption A acquires in its fall from a height of 4 yards the precise amount of force necessary to raise it back to the same height; and according to the second, this amount is equal to that required to raise a body of 4 pounds to a height of 1 yard; which is exactly, according to the first assumption, the amount of force which B acquires in its free fall from a height of 1 yard. Yet although at the bottom point both bodies have the same amount of force, it follows from Galileo’s laws of falling bodies that they have different amounts of quantity of motion at that point: the smaller body A that falls from a higher position acquires a velocity twice as that acquired by the larger body B falling from a lower point; but since A is four times smaller than B, its quantity of motion is half that of the latter.​[12]​
Leibniz generalizes the consequence of his analysis of a simple case of free fall of two bodies and concludes that “[t]here is thus a big difference between motive force and quantity of motion, and the one cannot be calculated by the other… It seems from this that force is rather to be estimated from the quantity of the effect which it can produce; for example, from the height to which it can elevate a heavy body of a given magnitude and kind,​[13]​ but not from the velocity which it can impress upon the body” (BD 297). 
The amount of force is thus proportional to the height to which a body can be raised in virtue of its speed and not to the speed itself as with Descartes. In Brief Demonstration Leibniz does not go on to draw explicitly the obvious conclusion that the amount of force is proportional to the square of the velocity, as is evident from the Galilean equation. He does not state that it should be estimated precisely by the product of mass and velocity squared (mv2), nor does he entitle it there “living force”. All this will have to await the Specimen Dynamicum of 1695. Here Leibniz distinguishes between “living force” or vis viva, which is an “ordinary force combined with motion” and “dead force” or vis mortua, which inheres in a body not yet moving and provides a solicitation to motion (SD 438). The first, Leibniz now asserts explicitly, is to be estimated by the product of mass and velocity squared.
4 Descartes’s mistake

It is noteworthy that Leibniz employs in the above mentioned argument an analysis of a case of free falling bodies and not of impact, where Descartes’s principle of conservation of quantity of motion is supposed to reside more naturally.​[14]​ When Leibniz analyzes cases of impact in order to refute Descartes’s principle, his success relies upon exploiting Descartes’s notorious mistake of neglecting the conservation of direction and considering the quantity of motion as a scalar rather than a vector magnitude (see, for example, the letter to Arnauld, November 28/December 8 1686; LA 97-99).
This mistake of Descartes was soon to be noticed. Three decades before Leibniz’s Brief Demonstration Christiaan Huygens questioned Descartes’s principle of conservation of quantity of motion and laws of impact, commenting in his correspondence that “if all Descartes’s laws are not false, except the first, then I am incapable of distinguishing true from false” and that “Descrates’s axiom on the conservation of motion according to which the same quantity of motion always exists seemed to me formerly quite true and in conformity with reason... [b]ut I know now that it cannot always be valid and must be replaced by a more evident principle”.​[15]​
The papers on the laws of motion submitted to the Royal Society of London by John Wallis, Christopher Wren, and Huygens in 1668-1669, exposed the essential shortcomings of Descartes’s analysis of conservation of motion and laws of impact. From the works of Huygens and Wren on impacts of perfectly elastic bodies it followed that in such impacts quantity of motion as had been defined by Descartes is not always conserved. Another quantity, however, turned out to remain the same before and after collisions of perfectly elastic bodies: the sums of the products of each body’s mass with the square of its own velocity () before and after the impact are equal. Wallis’s investigations of perfectly inelastic impacts showed that the Cartesian quantity of motion indeed is not always conserved. If, however, the direction of motion is taken into account and the quantity is considered as vectorial rather than scalar, then the quantity of motion thus interpreted can be said to be conserved in such impacts.​[16]​
As commentators have noticed, Leibniz was well acquainted with the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren. He was thus fully familiar with the difference between the scalar “quantity of motion” given by the product of mass and speed on the one hand, and the vector of mass times velocity later called momentum on the other. Accordingly, his arguments against Descartes were intended to show the advantage of living force or mv2 over the erroneous Cartesian quantity of motion, and not to reject the valid quantity of momentum or mv.​[17]​
5	Leibniz’s positive view – suppressing mv

It is unfortunate that Leibniz did not clearly stress this point in his public polemical writings against the Cartesians. In his unpublished critical remarks on Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy he wrote:

The most famous proposition of the Cartesians is that the same quantity of motion is conserved in things. They have given no demonstration of this, however, for no one can fail to see the weakness of their argument derived from the constancy of God. For although the constancy of God may be supreme, and he may change nothing except in accordance with the laws of the series already laid down, we must still ask what it is, after all, that he has decreed should be conserved in the series – whether the quantity of motion or something different, such as the quantity of force. I have proved that it is rather this latter which is conserved, that this is distinct from the quantity of motion, and that it often happens that the quantity of motion changes while the quantity of force remains permanent (Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes; L 393-394).

This passage echoes the general line of Brief Demonstration but is misleading, for it gives the impression that by dismissing the Cartesian quantity of motion Leibniz argues for a unique conservation principle – that of living force or mv2. But this is not the case. As a matter of fact Leibniz did acknowledge, in addition to the conservation of living force, the conservation of the vector quantity mv, namely, momentum. In the Essays on Dynamics, written in the 1690s but published only in the 19th century, he named it “quantity of progress”.​[18]​ 
He tried then to explain what seemed to be paradoxical in his position. In inelastic impacts, Leibniz argued, quantity of progress is conserved, to the effect that a body with greater force and a body with lesser force can mutually bring each other to a halt (“force” being understood here in its Leibnizian sense, i.e., as living force calculated by mv2). How can a weaker body stop a stronger one endowed with greater force? Leibniz explained it as follows. Consider a head-on collision between two bodies, A of mass 3 and velocity 2, and B of mass 2 and velocity 3. Before the collision A and B both have momentum of 6 units, but in opposite directions. That is, they have jointly a total quantity of progress or momentum of zero. If they stop one another in the collision, their total momentum is, of course, conserved. In addition, before the collision A has force of 12 whereas B has force of 18. “Although A is absolutely weaker than B”, Leibniz writes, “nevertheless in the concourse they can stop each other”. That happens because at the time of collision the bodies are not in motion, but rather static or in a state of equilibrium. Therefore, they act upon each other “only according to the laws of dead or static force[s]” which are estimated by the momenta of the bodies, which in this case are equal. Thus both A and B have a dead or static force of 6 units. By continually, mutually exhausting each other’s equal dead force, A and B eventually bring one another to a halt (ED 660).​[19]​
Yet it seems, even if Leibniz’s explanation is admissible, that there is a loss of force in this case. For before the impact bodies A and B jointly had a total force of 30, while after the impact they have none at all. Leibniz’s explanation of this apparent loss of force is tantamount to what later would be the principle of conservation of total energy. According to this explanation, the force of the macroscopic bodies is not lost but rather transferred to their molecules. In modern terms we would say that kinetic energy, in such cases, is not lost but rather transformed into heat:

But this loss of total force… does not detract from the inviolable truth of the law of the conservation of the same [living] force in the world. For that which is absorbed by the minute parts is not absolutely lost for the universe, although it is lost for the total force of the concurrent bodies (ED 670).​[20]​

6 Metaphysical reasons for preferring living force over “progress”

Leibniz thus accepted both principles. But why did he prefer the principle of conservation of living force – the precursor of the principle of conservation of energy – over that of conservation of quantity of progress or momentum? Why did he highlight the former and suppress the latter? As I will try to show now, contrary to what was the core of d’Alembert’s positivistic solution, Leibniz had metaphysical (rather than physical or mechanical) reasons for preferring the principle of conservation of living force. 
In the Essay on Dynamics Leibniz argued for, and gave the mathematical formulae of, three different physical laws of conservation in impact: the principle of conservation of relative velocity, according to which, given that two elastic bodies move on a straight line, the relative velocity with which they approach each other is equal to the relative velocity with which they depart after an impact;​[21]​ the principle of conservation of quantity of progress or momentum, and the principle of conservation of living force. He then commented that although he had put together the three formulae, any two of them would suffice, since any one of them could be mathematically derived from the other two (ED 658-661, 666-668). From the mathematical-mechanical point of view it was thus indifferent which would be regarded as fundamental and which as secondary. 
Furthermore, all Leibniz’s three principles are, from the point of view of classical physics, true. He was also keen to notice that the first applies only in elastic impacts. He correctly observed that the second is valid on the condition that no external forces interfere.​[22]​ Finally, he gave a basically correct explanation of the validity of the third in all kinds of impacts, though he did not connect the conservation of living force in inelastic collisions with the phenomenon of heat. As far as mechanics was concerned, Leibniz accepted all three principles. In particular, he acknowledged the conservation of both momentum and living force. He had no mathematical or physical reasons for granting either of the principles a privileged status over the others.
Hence, as far as the controversy is concerned with the legitimacy and conservation of the revised-Cartesian and the Leibnizian quantities (i.e., of the vector mv and of mv2), if the “resolution” of d’Alembert and others which were based on acknowledging the validity of both quantities in mechanics were supposed to be an answer to Leibniz, then these writers were simply barking up the wrong tree. For as we have just seen, Leibniz had already argued for both quantities half a century before d’Alembert’s Treatise on Dynamics was published. Moreover, as historians of science have noticed, the correct mathematical expressions and relations of the quantities involved, to which d’Alembert called attention, were already known and available to Leibniz and some of his contemporaries (see Hankins 1965: 286, esp. n.13; 1970: 209, esp. n.3).
Leibniz accepted both principles in physics. But for Leibniz, in addition to the physical discussion, the question which principle is metaphysically fundamental was crucial. In this context he was interested in metaphysical considerations, precisely of the kind that d’Alembert sought to exclude. “Besides purely mathematical principles”, Leibniz explained in Specimen Dynamicum, “there must be admitted certain metaphysical principles… since all the truths about corporeal things cannot be derived from logical and geometrical axioms alone, namely, those of great and small, whole and part, figure and situation, but there must be added those of cause and effect, action and passion, in order to give a reasonable account of the order of things” (SD 441).
Leibniz was well aware of the physical and mathematical contributions of Huygens, Wren, and Wallis to the matter in hand, and sought for the lacking metaphysical complementary account (SD 439-440). From the metaphysical point of view it was not at all indifferent which of the principles and their appropriate formulae are to be considered fundamental. Leibniz thus sought for a solution “which satisfies at the same time the rigor of the mathematicians and the wish of the philosophers” (ED 668). And such a solution, he believed, was exhibited in the third principle and its formula, namely, in the principle of conservation of living force, mathematically reckoned by mv2. For it is only the third that incorporates nothing that has to do with relations (as in the first principle) or spatial directionality (as in the second), both of which bore the status of mere phenomena, though “well founded” according to Leibniz’s metaphysics. 
Moreover, since direction is taken into account in the principle of conservation of momentum, a body can have, in relation to another, a negative quantity of momentum. Hence, if we sum up the momenta of several moving bodies the resultant momentum of the system may turn out to be zero: “it may happen that the velocity, quantity of motion, and force of bodies being very considerable, [yet] their progress is null” (ED 658). As we have seen above, head-on colliding bodies with equal but opposite momenta can stop one another. It is possible, therefore, that a system of bodies or a world in which only momentum (or any other vector quantity) is conserved will eventually run down although now we witness much motion and activity in it.​[23]​ Such a world will have to be regenerated by God. Consequently, it cannot be the best possible world and is unworthy of God’s wisdom and power. By contrast, the living force of a body, as the formula mv2 clearly shows, is a quantity that can never become negative. Hence the total amount of living force of a system of moving bodies will never nullify. Living force thus signifies something absolutely positive and real that is preserved in all occurrences of nature. A world whose motive force is equivalent to such a quantity will not run down.​[24]​ Therefore, it is living force that suits “the wish of the philosophers”.​[25]​
7 Some speculations on Leibniz’s motives

Leibniz explicitly writes in the unpublished Essay on Dynamics of 1692 that it is possible to provide an alternative explanation of quantity of motion, one that will correct the mistaken Cartesian conception:

It would be possible also to give another explanation of quantity of motion, according to which that quantity would be conserved, but it is not what is meant by Philosophers [i.e., the Cartesians]. For example, in the case of bodies A and B, each moving with its own velocity, the total quantity of motion is the sum of their individual quantities of motion; and that is what Descartes and his followers understood by quantity of motion, and to be convinced of the fact, it is only necessary to look at the rules of motion which he or others, who have adopted his principle, have given. But if we wanted quantity of motion to mean, not motion taken absolutely (where no attention is paid to the direction it takes), but progression in a certain direction then the total progression (or relative motion) will be the sum of the individual quantities of motion, when the two bodies come from the same direction. But when they come from opposite directions, it will be the difference of their individual motions. And it will be found that the same quantity of progression is conserved. But that must not be confused with the quantity of motion taken in the usual sense (Costabel 1973: 129). 

Why didn’t Leibniz say so, loud and clear, in his actual public confrontations with Cartesians, such as with the Abbé de Catelan (1686-1687) and Denis Papin (1689-1691)? Why didn’t he exercise his mastery of the art of controversy and openly suggest, as he did in the unpublished Essays on Dynamics, the correct alternative “explanation of quantity of motion” and claim to acknowledge it in addition to his living force? Indeed, as late as 1710 Leibniz admitted that his views on the matter had yet to be fully published:

It is known now that M. Descartes was much mistaken in his statement of [the laws of motion]. I have proved conclusively that conservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I consider that the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or directive and respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which carry this subject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in full; but I have communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, who have approved them, and have converted some other persons of acknowledged erudition and ability (T § 345, 332; my emphasis).

Leibniz gave no reasons for not publishing his complete analysis. Several possible answers, however, come to mind. Let me consider briefly two of them. In the first place, if the analysis given above is correct, then Leibniz’s position here turns heavily on his metaphysics. It involves considerations with regard to the degraded ontological status of relations and spatial directionality. These turn out to be, in the final analysis, not real. It also obliquely makes reference to the doctrines of the divine nature and the creation of the best possible world. These highly contentious metaphysical claims were part of his forming “mature metaphysics”. Now at least at the early stages of the controversy, when Leibniz was showing special interest in the discussion, he seemed to be still hesitating to publish this metaphysics. Recall that Leibniz believed he had succeeded in persuading Arnauld of the reasonability of his metaphysics in the correspondence immediately subsequent to the writing of the Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686 (see NS §1; L 453); yet a clear, public presentation was not offered before the New System of 1695. Moreover, if Leibniz was aiming at those whose opinions mattered such as the likes of Huygens and Newton, then he had good reason to avoid introducing controversial metaphysical reflections into his discussion. Accordingly, the Brief Demonstration of 1686 is mostly technical and almost entirely devoid of metaphysical speculation. Metaphysical considerations became significant in later writings.​[26]​
A second possible answer to our query has to do with Leibniz’s argumentative strategy in the controversy. We may use Gregory Brown’s reconstruction of the argument of Brief Demonstration to illustrate the point. Recall that on Brown’s reading the primary object of Brief Demonstration was to drive a wedge between the concepts of motive force and quantity of motion in order to “prepare the way for the introduction of a new measure of motive force – one that would be consistent, as the Cartesian measure was not, with the requirement that motive force be conserved” (Brown 1984: 132-133). Now if the only quantities on the table are m|v| and mv2, then driving a wedge between quantity of motion and motive force would naturally lead one to adopt mv2 as the measure of force. If, on the other hand, an additional quantity that does conform to the requirement of conservation of motive force is offered (e.g., mv), then driving a wedge between quantity of motion and motive force will not suffice for the acceptance of mv2. The point can be made differently, independently of Brown’s reading. Since “force” was not directly accessible, certain features were used to determine the plausibility or legitimacy of the candidates. For example, it was generally held that perpetual motion was absurd. Hence, if it could be shown that a suggested definition or measure of force implied a perpetual motion, then it would mean that it should be rejected. Similarly, since conservation was highly regarded, it would invest a measure with respectability if the latter could be shown to be conserved in nature. It is thus not totally implausible that Leibniz suppressed the conservation of progress in order to highlight and bring to the fore his measure and definition of living force.​[27]​
7.1 The case of Malebranche

Before I conclude, a short digression is in order. It is worth bearing in mind that in writing on the vis viva controversy, Leibniz addressed not only scientifically oriented scholars, but also thinkers with metaphysical and theological inclinations. One such philosopher was Nicolas Malebranche, a leading figure of his time, especially among French Cartesianism. Whoever his target audience was and whatever his goals and strategies in the controversy were, at least in the case of Malebranche, Leibniz succeeded. Malebranche eventually came round to Leibniz’s position. Leibniz celebrated Malebranche’s conversion at the opening of his Essay on Dynamics:

The opinion that the same quantity of motion is preserved and abides in the concourse of bodies has reigned a long time, and passed as an incontestable axiom among modern philosophers… We begin now to be disabused of this opinion, especially since it has been abandoned by some of its most ancient, most skilful, and most eminent defenders, and above all by the author himself of the Search after Truth [i.e., Malebranche] (ED 657).

Malebranche was under a constant pressure from Leibniz to reassess time and again his initial adherence to the Cartesian physics.​[28]​ He was forced, in particular, to reevaluate his acceptance of Descartes’s principle of conservation of quantity of motion and seven rules of impact. Malebranche discussed the laws of motion in the Search after Truth (Malebranche 1960: 39-44). Leibniz first attacked publicly Malebranche’s views on the matter in his answer to Catelan in the February 1687 issue of the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres. Malebranche’s rejoinder appeared later that year in the same journal. Leibniz’s next attack on Descartes’s and Malebranche’s laws of motion, in the July issue of the same year of the Nouvelles, was based on their violation of the principle of continuity.
Malebranche took Leibniz’s criticism into consideration and in 1692 he published a short treatise called Des Loix de la Communication des Mouvemens. He credited Leibniz’s objections for inducing him to reconsider his former position. But Leibniz was still not satisfied. For although Malebranche rejected some of Descartes’s rules of impact and the demonstration of the principle of conservation of quantity of motion, Malebranche still did not regard the content of that principle as false.​[29]​ It took some six more years before he rejected the principle itself. Malebranche wrote to Leibniz on December 13, 1698:
 
While in the countryside, where I had some leisure, I reread the small, unsatisfactory treatise on the communication of motion, and wanting to verify to my satisfaction the third laws, I realized that it was not possible to make experience fit Descartes’s principle according to which absolute motion always remains the same. Therefore, I have thoroughly changed this treatise, for I am now convinced that absolute motion continually decreases and increases, and that only the motion from the same direction remains the same in the collision. I have therefore thoroughly corrected this treatise, but I still don’t know when it will be reprinted. I tell you this, Sir, for you to continue to be convinced that I sincerely look for the truth, and that by virtue of this disposition of my mind, I partly deserve that you continue to love me as much as I honor you (GP 1 355-356).
 
Leibniz answered on March 13/23, 1699:

Regarding your Treatise on the Communication of Motion that you tell me, my Reverend Father, that you want to revise, in this I recognize both your penetration and your sincerity. One must be much more penetrating in order to see what must be changed in one’s own [works], than in order to discover it in the others’; but one must be very sincere in order to admit it, as you already did about the laws of motion in the Search after Truth, when you honored me by saying in your small treatise of 1692 that my reflections gave you the opportunity for your new considerations. However, I have found another thing in this treatise that seemed to me to face insurmountable difficulties; this compelled me to make some remarks about it; but I didn’t want to communicate them to you by fear of looking as a man who pretended to contradict you. Now that you want to rethink it, I send you these remarks, for you to reflect on those of them you think relevant. You now agree with me that the same quantity of absolute motion is not conserved, but that [the quantity of motion] from the same direction, which I call quantity of direction, is conserved. But I have to tell you that I believe that not only the same quantity of absolute force is conserved, but also that of absolute moving action, which I have found to be entirely different from what is called quantity of motion (GP 1 257, my italics).
 
Eventually Malebranche rejected the Cartesian scalar conservation principle, rules of impact, and conception of perfectly hard bodies instantaneously bouncing in impact. He came to support, instead, the principles of conservation of momentum and vis viva, and a Leibnizian conception of elastic bodies gradually rebounding in accordance with the principle of continuity. It is thus all the more puzzling, that even after the conversion of Malebranche, Leibniz still did not publish his full positive view, conveying thereby a false impression of his take on the issue.​[30]​   
8	Conclusion










^1	  For detailed historical accounts of the actual unfolding of the controversy and specific episodes of it, see Dugas 1958: 466-483; Hankins 1965; Laudan 1968; Calinger 1968; Iltis 1970, 1971; Costabel 1973: 41-65; Polonoff 1973: 5-38; Papineau 1977; Schönfeld 2000: 19-35; Freudenthal 2002. 
^2	  For challenges to this standard view, see Laudan 1968; Hankins 1965: 282-286, 1968: xix-xxiii, and 1970: 204-213; Iltis 1970.
^3	  Living Forces, §22, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, 33: “[Leibniz] leugnete Cartesens Gesetz absolut und ohne Einschränkung und setzte das seinige sofort an dessen Stelle”. 
^4	  In this respect it is important to bear in mind that Leibniz’s contemporaries had only limited access to his writings. In his own time and throughout the first half of the 18th century, Leibniz’s scientific and philosophical ideas were known almost entirely from the writings he published in his lifetime such as Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas (1684), Specimen Dynamicum (1695), A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances (1695), and the Theodicy (1710), and from essays and letters which were published immediately posthumously such as the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (1717), and The Monadology (1720). Only later did major writings such as the Discourse on Metaphysics and the New Essays on Human Understanding, and, particularly relevant to us here, several essays on dynamics, became publicly available. 
^5	  See Principles of Philosophy 1.68-70, 2.4, 4.201; The World, pp. 88-90/AT 11:23-27. Reference to Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy is to part and section.
^6	  “Nor in fact does space, or internal place, differ from the corporeal substance contained in it, except in the way in which we are accustomed to conceive of them. For in fact the extension in length, breadth, and depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the body” (Principles of Philosophy 2.10).
^7	  See Principles of Philosophy 2.23; The World, 88-90/AT 11 23-27; and especially: “That I do not accept or desire in Physics any other principles than in Geometry or abstract Mathematics; because all the phenomena of nature are explained thereby, and certain demonstrations concerning them can be given. – I shall not add anything here concerning figures, or the way in which there also result, from their infinite diversity, innumerable diversities of movement; because these things will be, of themselves, sufficiently obvious when the occasion to discuss them arises. Furthermore, I am supposing that my readers are already familiar with the rudiments of Geometry, or that they at least have capacities adequate to the understanding of Mathematical demonstrations. For I openly acknowledge that I know of no kind of material substance other than that which can be divided, shaped, and moved in every possible way and which Geometers call quantity and take to be the object of their demonstrations. And [I also acknowledge] that there is absolutely nothing to investigate about this substance except those divisions, shapes, and movements; and that nothing concerning these can be accepted as true unless it is deduced from common notions, whose truth we cannot doubt, with such certainty that it must be considered as a Mathematical demonstration. And because all Natural Phenomena can thus be explained, as will appear in what follows; I think that no other principles of Physics should be accepted, or even desired” (Principles of Philosophy 2.64).
^8	  Evidently, since extension is for Descartes the essence of body, the “size” of the body referred to here is its volume and not mass. However, although there was no clear concept of mass in the controversy, at the very least not before Newton’s Principia, we can ignore it as it has no bearing on the argumentative line advanced here. I shall henceforth take “size” to mean mass. On Newton’s concept of mass, see Cohen 1999: 85-95, and 2002: 58-60.
^9	  Because of its importance, I shall quote the relevant section in full: “That God is the primary cause of motion; and that He always maintains an equal quantity of it in the universe. – After having examined the nature of movement, we must consider its cause, which is twofold: {we shall begin with} the universal and primary one, which is the general cause of all the movements in the world; and then {we shall consider} the particular ones, by which individual parts of matter acquire movements which they did not previously have. As far as the general {and first} cause is concerned, it seems obvious to me that this is none other than God Himself, who, {being all-powerful} in the beginning created matter with both movement and rest; and now maintains in the sum total of matter, by His normal participation, the same quantity of motion and rest as He placed in it at that time. For although motion is only a mode of the matter which is moved, nevertheless there is a fixed and determined quantity of it; which, as we can easily understand, can be always the same in the universe as a whole even though there may at times be more or less motion in certain of its individual parts. That is why we must think that when one part of matter moves twice as fast as another twice as large, there is as much motion in the smaller as in the larger; and that whenever the movement of one part decreases, that of another increases exactly in proportion. We also understand that it is one of God’s perfections to be not only immutable in His nature, but also immutable and completely constant in the way He acts. Thus, with the exception of those changes which either manifest experience or divine revelation renders certain, and which we either perceive or believe to occur without any change on the part of the Creator; we must not suppose that there are any others in His works, for fear of accusing Him of inconstancy. From this it follows that it is completely consistent with reason for us to think that, solely because God moved the parts of matter in diverse ways when He first created them, and still maintains all this matter exactly as it was at its creation, and subject to the same law as at that time; He also always maintains in it an equal quantity of motion” (Principles of Philosophy 2.36).
^10	  The qualification “naturally” is added in order to appreciate Descartes’s too often overlooked reservation that conservation in the universe obtains “with the exception of those changes which either manifest experience or divine revelation renders certain, and which we either perceive or believe to occur without any change on the part of the Creator” (Principles of Philosophy 2.36). I take “manifest experience” and “divine revelation” to be indicators of changes in the motion of bodies caused by human souls and divine miracles respectively. 
^11	  Principles of Philosophy 2.43, 45. As Brown (1984: 131) summarizes, Descartes’s concept of motive force was “the concept of a power in moving bodies that was responsible for maintaining them in their states of motion, by which they could act upon one another in impacts, and which was transferred and conserved in impacts”. As a matter of fact, the issue is more complicated than my brief discussion here seems to suggest. For one thing, Descartes does not provide a clear, quantitative definition of force in general. For another, the notion of “remaining in the same state” is only vaguely formulated in the first two laws of nature. It can be understood thereof as maintaining the same shape, and as either remaining in a state of rest or continuing in the same direction of motion with the same speed (Principles of Philosophy 2.37-39). Since for Descartes motion and rest are qualitatively different, this suggests forces of three kinds: a force to resist a change in shape, a force to remain at rest, and a force to continue in motion. With regard to the measurement of force of a moving body there are actually four factors that have to be taken into account. In addition to mass and speed, Descartes now also speaks of “the [area of the] surface which separates this body from those around it”, and “the different ways in which bodies come in contact with one another”. He does not go on to say, however, how these four components are to be quantitatively incorporated. It is noteworthy that Descartes speaks here of a force “to continue to move at the same speed and in the same direction”. Yet, the Cartesian quantity of motion and force of moving body are regarded as scalar rather than vector quantities. For one reason, Descartes does not mention direction in the initial introduction of quantity of motion in section 36. Second, he draws a distinction between motion and “determination in some direction”. He notes in section 41 that “there is a difference between motion considered in itself, and its determination in some direction; this difference makes it possible for the determination to be changed while the quantity of motion remains intact”. Finally, in the application of the conservation principle in the rules of impact direction is not conserved. 
^12	  From Galileo’s results it follows that v2 is proportional to h (v is the velocity acquired in descent through the height h). Therefore, if B acquires a velocity of 1 unit in its fall from a height of 1 yard, then A acquires a velocity of 2 units in its fall from 4 yards. Hence, the quantity of motion of A is 1x2=2 and that of B is 4x1=4.
^13	  As Freudenthal (2002: 586, n. 13) explains, “the same ‘magnitude’ (volume) and ‘kind’ (density) together refer to ‘weight’, and hence indirectly to ‘mass’”.
^14	  On the relation between the analysis of impact and that of free fall in Leibniz’s dynamics, see Westfall 1971: 294-297, 302-303.
^15	  Huygens’s letters to Frans van Schooten Junior, October 29, 1654, and to René François de Sluse, January 3, 1658 (quoted from Dugas 1958: 281-282).
^16	  For accounts of the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren on the laws of impact, see Mach 1960: 402-406; Dugas 1958: 280-289, and 1988: 172-180; Hall 1966; Papineau 1977: 120-122. 
^17	  Carolyn Iltis, for example, notes that Leibniz was well acquainted with the contributions of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren, and with the difference between the scalar m|v| and the vector mv, and that his arguments against Descartes were therefore designed to establish the superiority of mv2 over the former and not over the latter (1971: 22). As I shall argue below, however, this is only partly true. Indeed, from the physical point of view, Leibniz believed, mv2 was not superior to mv. Yet he thought that there were metaphysical grounds to grant the former precedence over the latter (It should be noted, however, that Iltis does acknowledge the metaphysical import of living force in Leibniz’s view in the last part of her paper). Gregory Brown (1984) criticizes Iltis for taking Leibniz to be aiming at proving the conservation of motive force and for regarding his audience as adhering to the mistaken assumption that the Cartesian quantity of motion is conserved. On his reconstruction of the argument of Brief Demonstration, Leibniz took it as a metaphysical axiom that motive force is conserved, and was primarily aiming not at showing that quantity of motion is not conserved, but rather at “driving a wedge” between the concepts of motive force and quantity of motion and showing that they are not equivalent. As support he mentions the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren. He then comments that “by 1686… it was fairly common knowledge… that Descartes had been mistaken in thinking that quantity of motion was conserved”, and argues that Leibniz himself was convinced that this view was prevalent at least among “those whose opinions mattered” (1984: 128-129). Thus, on his reconstruction Leibniz addressed “those whose opinions mattered” who knew that m|v| was not conserved, or those who had reservations with regard to the conservation of m|v| and would happily give it up if only they could be shown that this concession would not commit them to a rejection of the conservation of motive force. Whether or not Brown’s criticism of Iltis is fair and his reconstruction is correct, its problems serve to highlight our point. For if Leibniz appealed to those who were convinced that m|v| was not conserved, why did he try to “drive a wedge” between m|v| and the concept of motive force without even mentioning the legitimate mv? “Those whose opinions mattered” surely knew that the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren not only rejected the conservation of the Cartesian quantity of motion, but also offered two alternative conservation principles, the conservation of mv and of mv2. If previously there had been reasons to link motive force with m|v|, after the latter’s deficiencies were exposed it must have seemed more natural to embrace mv and not mv2 in its place. Indeed, later thinkers who assumed the Cartesian side in the controversy argued for the conservation of mv. Moreover, as we shall see below, Leibniz himself offered to replace m|v| with mv. Therefore, a wedge should have been driven between motive force and mv as well. As for those who would happily give up m|v| if only an alternative conserved quantity were provided, they should not have been waiting almost two decades for Brief Demonstration. Since, again, the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren supplied the desired alternatives. And, in their case as well, a transition to mv would be natural. In sum, whoever the audience were – the experts, the hesitators, or the dogmatists who still adhered to m|v| – a complete analysis demanded dealing with all the quantities involved. But as we shall see, mv was suppressed in Leibniz’s public discussion.
^18	  I refer here to two writings called “Essay on Dynamics”. The one was written in 1692 and published by L.A. Foucher de Careil in 1859 and by Pierre Costabel in 1960 (English translation in Costabel 1973). The other was published in 1860 in Gerhardt’s edition of Leibniz’s Mathematische Schriften (GM 6 215-231) and translated by Langley in his edition of the New Essays. It was dated by Gerhardt to 1691. Costabel (1973: 30) noted that it had to be written at a later date due to its reference to “the conversion of Malebranche in 1698”, but commentators writing after Costabel seem to overlook this remark, still adhering to Gerhardt’s initial dating to the early 1690s (see, for example, Iltis 1971; Brown 1984; Garber 1995: 316). In a treatise on the “communication of motion” from 1692, Malebranche rejected some of Descrates’s rules of impact and the demonstration of the principle of conservation of quantity of motion, but still did not regard the content of that principle as false. Only later did he reject the principle itself. Consequently, assuming that Leibniz’s essay was written in the early 1690s, Brown thinks that its reference to Malebranche is to his treatise of 1692. Therefore, he considers Leibniz’s reference to Malebranche’s conversion in the treatise of 1692 “confident” and “overly optimistic” (1984: 132, n. 37). But Leibniz, as a matter of fact, was not deluded by Malebranche’s essay of 1692 and his reference to the conversion of Malebranche was not to the treatise of 1692. As late as January 1698 he still wrote to Denis Papin of the confusion of Descartes and Malebranche with regard to the conservation of quantity of motion (A III 7 449). His correspondence with Malebranche later that year (see section 7.1 below) shows that he was aware of the shortcomings of the treatise of 1692 and of the conversion that had taken place in 1698. In short, Leibniz’s correspondence supports Costabel’s claim that the Essay on Dynamics in Gerhardt’s edition of Leibniz’s Mathematische Schriften could not have been written before 1698. It is also noteworthy that in a letter to Malebranche from March 1699 (quoted below) Leibniz referred to “action motrice” (moving action), a concept that did not appear in earlier writings such as Brief Demonstration or the Essay on Dynamics of 1692, but figures in the title of the essay under discussion.    
^19	  See also the Essay of Dynamics of 1692, in Costabel 1973: 127-129. 
^20	  See also Leibniz’s 5th letter to Clarke, §99: “The author [Clarke] objects, that two soft or un-elastic bodies meeting together, lose some of their force.  I answer, no. ’Tis true, their wholes lose it with respect to their total motion; but their parts receive it, being shaken [internally] by the force of the concourse. And therefore that loss of force is only in appearance. The forces are not destroyed, but scattered among the small parts. The bodies do not lose their forces; but the case here is the same, as when men change great money into small” (LC 87-88). Freudenthal (2002: 574, 613, 617-618, 626) suggests that Leibniz may have arrived at this idea through his public controversy with Denis Papin between 1689 and 1691. 
^21	  This principle was established by Huygens as the fourth proposition of his The Motion of Colliding Bodies: 579-580. 
^22	  He writes in the Essay on Dynamics of 1692: “the ground for this maxim of progression is rather apparent, and it is reasonable, when nothing happens from without, that everything (composed of moving bodies) should not be hindered from progressing by itself as much as before” (Costabel 1973: 129). This remark shows that he was aware of the condition that the resultant momentum of a system of bodies is conserved so long as no external forces are applied.
^23	  To prevent a system of bodies in which a vector quantity is conserved from running down, God has not only to decree conservation, but also to assign it some positive value. 
^24	  One could argue that in this case too, God has to decree conservation and to assign it a positive value. The point is, however, that a world in which living force is conserved cannot run down: either it is completely inert (i.e., lacks even the potential to be active) from the outset, or it will persist in its activity. A world with enduring motion, however, may suffer other disasters. For example, it may come to a state of “heat death” in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics. Although motion will not cease and “living force” may remain the same, it is doubtless a different form of “running down”. 
^25	  See ED 667-668. For similar interpretations of this point, see Iltis 1971: 33; Garber 1995: 318-319.
^26	  This is not to suggest that Leibniz did not address speculative metaphysicians as well or that metaphysical considerations were entirely absent from his arguments. Rather, the point is that at least at the early stages of the controversy Leibniz employed more conventional metaphysical principles such as the equality of cause and effect and the law of continuity. He argued for the reality of force over and above the property of extension and for a dynamical conception of material substances, but still did not link it to the robust metaphysical conception of material substances as constituted by substantial forms (primitive active force) and primary matter (primitive passive force). These further metaphysical contentions are present, for example, in Specimen Dynamicum of 1695. But here too, the clear analysis of the Essays on Dynamics is missing. Although the vis viva controversy is not the main issue of Specimen Dynamicum, this absence diminishes somewhat the strength of the answer offered here. 
^27	  Freudenthal, writing on the Leibniz-Papin Controversy, argues that from the very first the range of possibilities was restricted to m|v| and mv2 (which is proportional to mh). The reason is that both quantities were drawn from statics, and it was implicitly agreed by both sides that free fall was an extension of the area of statics (2002: 582-583, 587). But if broader questions of conservation are involved and if Leibniz was interested in motive force in general and in answering how the force of a body in motion should be measured, then this is unsatisfactory. For bodies in motion do not only fall, but also roll, move horizontally, etc. In particular, they collide, and collision essentially involves mv. Impact was commonly conceived as the fundamental interaction and source of change of motion in the material world (Leibniz himself held this view with regard to the phenomenal, physical world). If so, reflections on motive force could not ignore mv. Furthermore, considerations concerning conservations had been already present in the works of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren on the laws of impact, and all the three quantities (m|v|, mv, and mv2) were discussed. Leibniz himself linked living force and impact from the very first stage of the controversy, as the letter to Arnauld of November 28/ December 8, 1686 (LA 97-99) clearly testifies. Naturally, he connected them most lucidly in the Essays on Dynamics. In short, if the vis viva controversy and the problem of impact are intimately involved, as I have tried to show they are, then the range of possibilities must have included mv, in addition to m|v| and mv2. 
^28	  A thorough examination of the influence of Leibniz on Malebranche is beyond the scope of this study. For a detailed discussion of Malebranche’s successive revisions of his earlier Cartesianism in this context, as well as his movement towards Leibniz’s position, see Pyle 2003: 131-157. I rely heavily on his account.
^29	  That Malebranche did not reject in 1692 the Cartesian principle of conservation of quantity of motion is also evident from his correspondence with Leibniz right after the publication of his treatise. See his letter from December 8, 1692 (GP 1 343-344).
^30	  Costabel argues that publishing against Cartesian mechanics at the beginning of the 1690s and before the conversion of Malebranche must have appeared to Leibniz “very risky” (1973: 30). This, however, cannot be regarded as a reason for not publishing the Essays on Dynamics. For despite the risk, ever since 1686 Leibniz had been publicly arguing against Cartesian mechanics. Furthermore, the unpublished Essays on Dynamics offered the quantity mv as a correction for Descartes’s m|v|, and this must have seemed to the French Cartesians more appealing than the brute rejection of the Cartesian quantity in Brief Demonstration. Finally, even if the risk can explain Leibniz’s refrainment from publishing at the beginning of the 1690s, it cannot explain the fact that Leibniz still did not publish his full view after Malebranche’s conversion. 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